Ethereum (ETH) Price Prediction 2020, 2023, 2025 PrimeXBT

web3.0

Web3 is a vision, idea, and movement for a decentralized web. Web3 is free of third party intermediaries and makes it so that infrining on individual's privacy is extremely expensive. Web3 was term coined by Dr. Gavin Wood in a 2014 blog post: http://gavwood.com/web3lt.html.
[link]

We’re building the Ethereum Computer - Slock.it blog

We’re building the Ethereum Computer - Slock.it blog submitted by Ursium to ethereum [link] [comments]

Our Proposal: Taking Ethereum to the Mainstream with the Ethereum Computer - Slock.it Blog

Our Proposal: Taking Ethereum to the Mainstream with the Ethereum Computer - Slock.it Blog submitted by Ursium to ethereum [link] [comments]

Our Proposal: Taking Ethereum to the Mainstream with the Ethereum Computer — Slock.it Blog

Our Proposal: Taking Ethereum to the Mainstream with the Ethereum Computer — Slock.it Blog submitted by FARTINGTOOLOUD to ethtrader [link] [comments]

Embarassing post by slock.it, six days ago: No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract ‘recursive call’ bug discovery — Slock.it Blog

Embarassing post by slock.it, six days ago: No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract ‘recursive call’ bug discovery — Slock.it Blog submitted by Geldeintreiber to btc [link] [comments]

Why we are building the Ethereum Framework for Ubuntu Core [Slock.it Blog]

Why we are building the Ethereum Framework for Ubuntu Core [Slock.it Blog] submitted by Ursium to ethereum [link] [comments]

Let’s play with Snappy Ethereum! [Slock.it Blog]

Let’s play with Snappy Ethereum! [Slock.it Blog] submitted by Ursium to ethereum [link] [comments]

The Ethereum Wallet: An Introduction for Non-Devs - [Slock.it Blog]

The Ethereum Wallet: An Introduction for Non-Devs - [Slock.it Blog] submitted by Ursium to ethereum [link] [comments]

Embarassing post by slock.it, six days ago: No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract recursive call bug discovery Slock.it Blog

Embarassing post by slock.it, six days ago: No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract recursive call bug discovery Slock.it Blog submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

How to stake Matic on the Matic Network's Testnet

I have released a step by step guide on how to stake Matic tokens on the Matic Network Testnet. Mainnet features will be rolled out on the 29th.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZEXbnrHRjA
Links: Metamask- Browser based Ethereum Wallet https://metamask.io/
Matic Network's wallet + Staking https://cs-wallet.matic.today/ Goerli testnet faucet- https://goerli-faucet.slock.it/ Matic Developer- What is Matic Network? https://docs.matic.network/docs/valid... (Used to set up validator node and to learn more about Matic) Matic Network's Staking Economics https://blog.matic.network/matic-netw... (Rewards for staking phases)
submitted by Michael-Huynh to maticnetwork [link] [comments]

The NEW NEW NEW If you need some Görli Testnet Ethers ...

Try out the following faucets. If all don't work, post a message below and I'll send you 5 GöETH:
You should be running recent versions of the Ethereum client node software (Geth, Besu, or Nethermind on the Görli test network).
To sync geth to Görli, try:
geth --goerli 
To sync besu to Görli, try:
besu --network goerli 
The blockchain explorer for the Görli test network is https://goerli.etherscan.io/
You can find the old archived version of this post at https://www.reddit.com/ethdev/comments/87d454/the_new_new_if_you_need_some_ropsten_testnet/ (for Ropsten testnet).
Happy developing/testing!
What is Görli? https://github.com/goerli/testnet
Why Görli? https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/69592/87
Why not Ropsten? https://youtu.be/uzGEmO7H5aU?t=295
submitted by q9fm to ethdev [link] [comments]

Is running a archive node helping the network

So, i was reading this and i was just wondering if this helps the network in some way.
I mean if no one is running full archive nodes, will that be bad for the network?
submitted by ILoveWashBucket to ethereum [link] [comments]

Former Ethereum CCO Stephan Tual joins Slock.it Team

Christoph Jentzsch, Founder, said ”Stephan’s expertise will be critical when negotiating with our present and future integration partners. He was part of the Ethereum project since day one, has an excellent standing within the community, and his dutiful approach to relationship building is something we look forward to see flourish within Slock.it.”
submitted by daydreamtrader to ethereum [link] [comments]

Slock.it Dream Team! With the Additions of Gavin, Christian and Lefteris, Slock.it will be a spectacular team to watch!

Slock.it Dream Team! With the Additions of Gavin, Christian and Lefteris, Slock.it will be a spectacular team to watch! submitted by daydreamtrader to ethereum [link] [comments]

The Ethereum Computer - Powered by the Raspberry Pi! Connect with Slock.it for a Dev Kit!

The Ethereum Computer - Powered by the Raspberry Pi! Connect with Slock.it for a Dev Kit! submitted by daydreamtrader to raspberry_pi [link] [comments]

FAQ: What exactly is the fraud in Ethereum?

Most important above all else, Ethereum has never been decentralized since its distribution (i.e. premine) & thus value of incentives depend entirely on 1 trusted party, the exact opposite of decentralization or trust minimization [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Calling themselves decentralized is literally deception of others for profit, which is by the most standard definitions called fraud.
Below is an example of how this centralization manifests and the absolute lack of ethics & types of other fraud behind Ethereum:
Historic account of bailout, fraud, and centralization: how Ethereum Foundation demonstrated to have full control over the ethereum blockchain beyond reasonable doubt while advertising falsely for profit
Point by point summary (sources cited below):
  1. Ethereum Foundation (EF) sell centrally pre-mined/pre-made Eth coins in ICO for centralized funding/profit while advertising "unstoppable .. exactly as programmed" code (regular cryptocurrencies are 0% premined, EF had 72m coins premined on day 0 which is ~70% of current supply)
  2. Slock.it developers including eth co-founder create an app called DAO on it for the purposes of funding themselves even more with claims that their "code sets the terms and conditions" like no one has done before them for even more money.
  3. DAO code has a mistake and starts giving away money to a user, vocal fraction of community is divided whether to bailout DAO investors, many unofficial polls show conflicting results with extremely low participation making it unclear whether the super majority is even aware or cares about this 3rd party issue.
  4. EF members refuse to disclose if they are invested in the DAO after promoting it, and many are later found to have been invested in it.
  5. EF tells exchanges there will not be a minority chain surviving, ignoring the divided community, and making it impossible to sell no-bailout version
  6. EF makes the carbonvote the "official" vote 12 hours before the release of the client--after repeatedly claiming for weeks it had no official capacity, and after already having made support for the fork the default option in the codebase. The vote only shows 4% of possible consensus supporting bailout, 1/4 of it from one vote.
  7. Most automated nodes and miners that run "apt-get upgrade && apt-get update" switch over even if haven't seen the announcement 12 hours prior and fork is declared a success.
  8. No-bailout chain survives regardless despite Foundation's efforts, but Ethereum Foundation refuses to update it even if it increases in popularity or size.
  9. Ethereum projects are forced to choose between developed chain with ICO funding, bailout, roadmap and one with no funding, no clear devs, no roadmap. Most are forced to stay with Ethereum Foundation holding central ICO funding & updates hostage.
  10. EF sells the unsold premined coins they still own on the no-bailout chain (forked premine), thus damaging its value
  11. EF members participate in White Hat Group (WHG), use same method used to drain DAO to drain no-bailout chain DAO and then market sell no bail-out ether on the exchanges damaging no-bailout chain value further
  12. EF changed the properties of the security it sold and still falsely advertises "unstoppable .. exactly as written" code (despite proving it false) while profiting from all of it.
Almost all the above actions are fraud.
Details and sources:
Top left of the banner shows marked up graphic [1] of ethereum.org claims including
"decentralized platform that runs smart contracts exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud".
Additionally, the third party app "the DAO" also re-iterated in their contract the similar premise that their code IS the terms and conditions [1,2]. Both DAO and Eth were sold advertised as such in their initial phases.
However, the DAO was programmed in a poorly done manner [1] and allowed loss of the investments put into it [2]. It was no secret members of the Ethereum Foundation (EF) were connected to the DAO often promoting it. Many were found to be invested in the DAO as time passed [1,2,3] , yet refused to disclose it when asked directly [4,5,6]. Despite the loss due to DAO contract being an issue of only minority of users, virtually all mentioned advertised properties of ethereum and the DAO were changed by the Ethereum Foundation to manually reverse the operations the smart contract ran while profiting from it.
How did they do it? By exploiting and proving centralization
Several centralized aspects of Ethereum were used to achieve this result:
  1. EF controls the defaults settings in codebase to get what they want. Only 12 hours before before the release of the client they selected carbonvote the "official" vote out of many varying options (after repeatedly claiming for weeks it had no official capacity, and after already having made support for the fork the default option in the codebase). This selected poll had many issues discussed below including 96% of possible votes not showing support for EF/DAO bailout. However the 4% vote with quarter from single vote with only hours of official notice before were used as justification anyway for bailout as default setting [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. By controlling the defaults, they easily took advantage of anyone not up to date on announcement hours earlier who automatically updated and/or the apathetic users to control the blockchain. By moving focus from what's best for majority via opt-in consensus (blockchain standard) to giving only a short window to opt-out, they can centrally manipulate the blockchain in almost any manner without enraging the majority into action [1,2]. As expected, the fork was quickly declared a success [1,2,3]. Control over codebase also allowed them to compromise those opting out by leaving them open to replay attacks, thus further damaging their value as can be seen celebrated by DAO and Eth cofounder Stephan Tual [1]. Effectively, this was equivalent to a successful 4% attack on a blockhain or even attack by a single centralized entity (EF). The approach is easily repeatable and exact opposite of expected censorship resistance against <50% attacks, thus proving it unsecure.
  2. EF has complete centralized ownership of the funds from 70% premine in form of eth and ICO BTC raised [1]. This made them the only well funded core developers and thus the only choice for rapid development and fully in control of what gets updated. By choosing to address this third party contract issue, by refusing to update the old chain, they effectively held their funding and updates hostage to make sure people can't opt out without significant costs [1,2]. Additionally, with such capital, it's trivial to affect the swing vote for under-represented polls with eth or hashpower making their polling governance methods unsecure. Furthermore, once the old chain did receive an exchange and thus possible value, the old chain coins from EF premine were used to damage the value of the old chain further [1].
  3. EF has name recognition as the founders, name ownership of "the real Eth" or ETH, with even a trademark [1]. Unlike volunteer based or anonymous core teams, EF is Swiss nonprofit operating as a single entity. When a high publicity issue appeared that threatened their money, they were able to stop trade on major exchanges with a simple message [1,2].
  4. Exchanges were deceived by the EF into belief there will be no one in dissent of the self-bailout fork (leaving the other fork without a market and 0 worth) and not prepared for people opting out of bailout [1,2,3], which was misleading due to highly uncertain polls (below). This deception allowed them to be the only chain with value following the fork, and allowed them to keep the name. Despite it all, dissent was also to exist by original chain surviving and prospering even under countless harmful actions of the EF (usually 1/3rd of Eth in number of transactions, 45-50% of marketcap at peak [3], and even longer chain on at least one occasion).
EF demonstrated ability and willingness to cease trade, fork, and affect entire network when a single app of their choosing fails while profiting from it [1]. The non-democratic nature of the decision was noted by many [1,2].
Changes in properties of the ether security - securities fraud
The "unstoppable" app was sending money to an unknown user. What followed was the controversial change of the advertised rules where EF stopped the app by censoring that transaction without consent and confiscated the transaction contents resulting in personal profit for EF devs and friends. The rule change that let EF and friends profit financially while harming someone else financially is very plausibly securities fraud [1,2,3,4]. Additionally, it was a clear conflict of interest in governance.
The change of the rules of the security associated platform to censor or run applications based on feelings of how it should run (e.g. liked/ok or disliked/exploit) by the Ethereum Foundation (a centralized entity) broke the EF and DAO earlier statements on decentralization, lack of censorship, and explicit execution of code. While the user followed all the known rules from statements of the platform and the app, the fork rule changes were applied not to fix a bug but to undo previous actions using new rules ex post facto. The changes were retroactive and arbitrary: stopping the app and censoring the user by reverting his money transfer back to where they could take it out, subjectively justified by calling it a theft. Blockchains gain value by decentralizing trust to numerous different parties thus creating censorship resistance against minority attacks and thus security. Ethereum Foundation supported ether asset changed from decentralized, trustless, secure, censorship-resistant platform asset to (proven based on EF actions) centralized, trust-requiring, unsecure, censorable platform asset hence damaging said value. However, to this day the advertisement of the properties of the ether security has not changed, long after EF actions proved virtually every statement in them false. No safeguards were put into place to prevent a repeat as well. This makes it a case of continuous securities fraud as well.
What choice did community have? Bad and worse.
No evidence of community support for bailout
The justifications of the self-bail out forks are often in the tone of it being a democratic decision or that there was agreement from the community. The survival of the original chain both in value and transactions despite being damaged in value by the EF and even when it had no market value is a demonstration it was not an insignificant disagreement. Additionally, often several voluntary polls are referred to with ~5% eth and 12% hash turnout and single digit 4% and 9% vote of all possible votes for self-bail out fork [1,2,3] - far from majority. Historic archives of the subreddit and simple online polls during the time show much stronger opposition to bailout [1,2,3,4,5].
Issues with official poll
  1. The low turnouts of a voluntary insignificant poll done on a little known subreddit instead of protocol level makes it statistically insignificant. EF made carbon vote the "official" vote 12 hours before the release of the client after claiming it had no official capacity and after making support for the EF-bailout fork default option in the code base [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Additionally, due to low turn out and polls could be easily manipulated for financial gain by buying eth or renting hash power momentarily just for the vote by third parties (thus breaking another earlier statement). About 1/4th of the 5% eth vote was from a single voter [1].
  2. Voluntary polls are extremely susceptible to biases. Voluntary response bias strongly favors those with stronger incentives to respond and thus results in sampling bias: the profit coming from self-bailout of a minor third party app investors is far stronger incentive than voting for standard operation of a blockchain. Uncast votes from apathy or not being up to date was prevalent accounting for 90%+ mentioned above. By setting the bailout as the default setting (unlike opt-in setting used typically elsewhere) with only 12 hour warning, anyone not paying attention was tricked into supporting the bailout. Nodes can simply automate "apt-get upgrade && apt-get update" so this setting took advantage of everyone who hasn't seen official announcement only hours earlier [1].
  3. Censorship resistance is often taken for granted in crypto projects as it is expected as the minimum requirement of something being called a blockchain. This expectation results in a bias from bystander effect [1] and diffusion of responsibility to ensure it: many assume vote for censorship resistance is a sure thing but will definitely happen by others voting. What can happen is a group expects someone else to vote and ends up in almost no one voting.
  4. By the EF labeling the unintended execution of a contract "an exploit" and the person doing it "the attacker" alleging "theft" (which was not a universal interpretation) and stating support for the bailout, they introduced leading question bias that increases tendency to vote in a way that favored bailout. Additionally, individuals and companies had to face a social desirability bias where they were more likely to vote in a way that would feel more socially acceptable.
In summary on 2 polls selected and referenced by the EF is that there is no conclusive evidence of majority support for the bailout fork. Similar conclusions were reached by others. [1]
Financial & value attacks
Ethereum Foundation refused to work on the older chain thus damaging the older security they sold [1,2]. Ethereum Foundation took the premine from the development of the original chain, which is possible theft. Ethereum Foundation took the money of a rule following user, which is possible theft [1]. Ethereum Foundation compromised security of the old chain by keeping it open to replay attacks hurting its value further[1]. Ethereum Foundation damaged the value of the competing asset of the original chain using the stolen premine by selling it on exchanges [1] and making fun of doing so [2]. Ethereum Foundation and closely related White Hat Group (WHG) not only took the remaining money from the DAO on their chain, but also on the original chain, and then used the funds to damage the price of the competing asset on the exchanges [1,2,3,4].
Every level of Ethereum proven to be unsecure and not trustworthy
Additionally, every level of ethereum after proven centralized requires trust. And it's easily shown how each level cannot be trusted thus lowering its value:
  1. Code: Ethereum Foundation (EF) via demonstration of centralized control stated and shown that they will decide how code should run instead of as written, so the code itself doesn't matter, and it can't be trusted to handle transactions, balances, apps.
  2. Apps: Ethereum foundation broke the promises of a third party app called DAO that very uniquely stated code sets the terms, so eth apps cannot be trusted.
  3. EF: Ethereum foundation also broke its own advertised statements about the platform when it censored users and stopped apps to take others money for subjective reasons. Additionally, their refusal to acknowledge conflict of interest, making a poll official only hours before pushing the update, and abusing power of defaults in the code shows so Ethereum Foundation cannot be trusted [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Additionally, centralization shown by EF makes it a weak spot for malicious actors to attack the entire platform using incentives (e.g. litigation, force, threat, pressure 1) to force them to exercise the control over the chain once again with existing precedent. There's no way to gain trust that this attack vector won't be used.
*
The self-bailout fork events demonstrated centralized Ethereum Foundation has complete centralized control over every level of this blockchain: every transaction and every app. It proved that EF has capability and the will to use it to overwrite operation of any smart contract even if it serves their self interest. In other words, Eth is a proven unsecure centralized censorable trust-requiring platform that can't be trusted on any level with any aspect of operation. There are zero safeguards currently in place to prevent EF from taking advantage of their control from occurring again. Additionally this is public information making it a well known centralized weakness and, thus, a known attack vector that could be used by interested third parties, which would be nothing new [1].
Nothing has been done to fix it and continues to be part of Ethereum's flawed premine controlled "economic forks"[1].
This subreddit is a curated collection of resources for education purposes only that would be difficult to find downvoted on biased ethereum subreddits to protect and warn people from being hurt by this fraud via investment or development on top of a nonsecure blockchain.
Other notable events about Ethereum to read about:
SUMMARY: Ethereum is an unsecure, trust-requiring, centralized, mutable platform that runs stoppable apps and censors people Ethereum Foundation (EF) dislikes - the opposite of what it advertises itself as. Ethereum Foundation misrepresents what Ethereum is to prospective investors for increasing the value of the traded asset ETH while profiting financially. This means, by definition, Ethereum Foundation is participating in fraud by continuously misleading investors. Furthermore, the act of suddenly changing the properties of the unregistered security after the sale of the security in the initial coin offering (ICO) and/or on exchanges while profiting personally constitutes securities fraud. Additionally, Ethereum Foundation is connected to damaging the value of sold assets, damaging the value of competing assets, theft from competition, and market manipulation of competing assets for profit.
Nothing has changed after historic actions proved centralization beyond reasonable doubt. Eth is still centralized, unsecure, and gains value only through fraud
submitted by newweeknewacct to ethereumfraud [link] [comments]

The Ethereum Computer — Securing your identity and your IoT with the Blockchain!

submitted by daydreamtrader to bigdata [link] [comments]

DTH: Voting request for Counter-Attack Proposals.

This is a request that has to do with the DAO counter-attack plan as discussed in the past here and here.
People from the Robin hood group have made the following proposals which are going to reach their debate period end quite soon. It would be really nice if any DTH who would like to help, vote in favour of the following proposals:
Proposal ID Description Debate Period End Etherscan Link
242 Payout the extra Balance back to the mother DAO 2016-07-08 15:16:20 +00:00 http://etherscan.io/token/thedao-proposal/242
243 Buy 1K worth of dark DAO tokens with the curator multisig as the recipient 2016-07-08 15:57:08 +00:00 http://etherscan.io/token/thedao-proposal/243
254 1 ETH version - Attack contract that gives us flexibility 2016-07-12 19:09:00 +00:00 http://etherscan.io/token/thedao-proposal/254
255 247k ETH version - Attack contract that gives us flexibility 2016-07-12 20:13:06 +00:00 http://etherscan.io/token/thedao-proposal/255
At the moment there is a lot of work regarding the HF by many developers in the Ethereum community. This plan is unrelated to the HF and is just something to have as a backup in case the HF does not happen.
Your help is going to be appreciated.
Edit:
Chance of success
Note that this move does not guarantee any money back, and should not affect any decisions on HF. As already stated many times both in the blogpost and elsewhere the counter-attack has a lot of moving parts and without an SF it's almost guaranteed that it will not return most of the funds to the DTH.
This move is just to help the robin hood in case an HF does not go through.
Edit3:
Voting Instructions
Edit2:
TL;DR explanation:
If you vote
  1. Your tokens will be blocked and can't be traded until the end of the debating period of the proposal you voted for.
  2. You will have helped in the counter-attack plan as described in the blog posts.
  3. No guarantees about actual return of ETH can be given. Without a SF the counter-attack plan is really really weak. Still better than nothing but it's really weak. That's why we need an HF.
If you don't vote
  1. You don't help towards (2) from the 'If you vote' scenario.
  2. Your tokens are not blocked for the duration of the vote since you did not vote, and you can freely trade them in exchanges.
submitted by LefterisJP to ethereum [link] [comments]

Why Turing-complete smart contracts are doomed: "Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing both posed the same question: 'Can we find a universal procedure to prove that a mathematical theory is true or false?' They each, in their own way, answered 'NO': there exist some mathematical truths that cannot be proven."

Summary:
(1) Turing-complete languages are fundamentally inappropriate for writing "smart contracts" - because such languages are inherently undecidable, which makes it impossible to know what a "smart contract" will do before running it.
(2) We should learn from Wall Street's existing DSLs (domain-specific languages) for financial products and smart contracts, based on declarative and functional languages such as Ocaml and Haskell - instead of doing what the Web 2.0 "brogrammers" behind Solidity did, and what Peter Todd is also apparently embarking upon: ie, ignoring the lessons that Wall Street has already learned, and "reinventing the wheel", using less-suitable languages such as C++ and JavaScript-like languages (Solidity), simply because they seem "easier" for the "masses" to use.
(3) We should also consider using specification languages (to say what a contract does) along with implementation languages (saying how it should do it) - because specifications are higher-level and easier for people to read than implementations which are lower-level meant for machines to run - and also because ecosystems of specification/implementation language pairs (such as Coq/Ocaml) support formal reasoning and verification tools which could be used to mathematically prove that a smart contract's implementation is "correct" (ie, it satisfies its specification) before even running it.
Details:
http://www.otherpress.com/features/alan-turing-kurt-godel-two-asymptotic-destinies/
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=turing+g%C3%B6del+undecidability&ia=web
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=turing+g%C3%B6del+incompleteness&ia=web
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=%22turing+complete%22+%22g%C3%B6del+incompleteness%22&ia=web
When I have more time later, I will hopefully be able to write up a more gentle introduction on all this stuff, providing more explanations, motivations, and examples for laypersons who are interested in getting a feel for the deep subtle mathematical implications at play here in these emerging "language design wars" around recent proposals to add "smart contracts" to cryptocurrencies.
Right now I'm just providing this quick heads-up / reminder / warning, alluded to in the title of the OP, with some more pointers to the literature in the links above.
People who already do have a deep understanding of mathematics and its history will get the message right away - by recalling the crisis in the foundations of mathematics which occurred in the early 1900s, involving concepts like Russell's paradox, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, undecidability, Turing completeness, etc.
Turing-complete languages lead to "undecidable" programs (ie, you cannot figure out what you do until after you run them)
One hint: recall that Gödel's incompleteness theorem proved that any mathematical system which is (Turing)-complete, must also be inconsistent incomplete [hat tip] - that is, in any such system, it must be possible to formulate propositions which are undecidable within that system.
This is related to things like the Halting Problem.
And by the way, Ethereum's concept of "gas" is not a real solution to the Halting Problem: Yes, running out of "gas" means that the machine will "stop" eventually, but this naïve approach does not overcome the more fundamental problems regarding undecidability of programs written using a Turing-complete language.
The take-away is that:
When using any Turing-complete language, it will always be possible for someone (eg, the DAO hacker, or some crook like Bernie Madoff, or some well-meaning but clueless dev from slock.it) to formulate a "smart contract" whose meaning cannot be determined in advance by merely inspecting the code: ie, it will always be possible to write a smart contract whose meaning can only be determined after running the code.
Take a moment to contemplate the full, deep (and horrifying) implications of all this.
Some of the greatest mathematicians and computer scientists of the 20th century already discovered and definitively proved (much to the consternation most of their less-sophisticated (naïve) colleagues - who nevertheless eventually were forced to come around and begrudgingly agree with them) that:
The horrifying conclusion is that:
This all is based on a very, very deep result of mathematics (Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, as referenced in some of the links above) - which even many mathematicians themselves had a hard time understanding and accepting.
And it is also very, very common for programmers to not understand or accept this deep mathematical result.
Most programmers do not understand the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem on Turing-complete languages
As a mathematician first, and a programmer second, I can confirm from my own experience that most programmers do not understand this important mathematical history at all, and its implications - it is simply too subtle or too foreign for them to grasp.
Their understanding of computing is childish, naïve, and simplistic.
They simply view a computer as a marvelous machine which can execute a sequence of instructions in some language (and please note that, for them, that language usually happens to simply "come with" the machine, so they unquestionably accept whatever language that happens to be - ie, they almost never dive deeper into the subtle concepts of "language design" itself - a specialized area of theoretical computer science which few of them ever think about).
Paradigms lost
As we've seen, time after time, this failure of most programmers contemplate the deeper implications of "language design" has has led to the familiar litany of disasters and "learning experiences" where programmers have slowly abandoned one "programming paradigm" and moved on to the next, after learning (through bitter experience) certain hard facts and unpleasant, non-intuitive realities which initially escaped their attention when they were simply enjoying the naïve thrill of programming - such as the following:
Today, in cryptocurrencies, we are seeing this sad history repeat itself, with plenty of examples of programmers who don't understand these subtle concepts involving the foundations of mathematics - specifically, the mathematical fact (Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem) that any logical system or language which is "powerful" enough to be "Turing complete" must also be inconsistent.
The naïve Ethereum people think they've cleverly sidestepped this with the notion of "gas" but actually all they're doing is cheating with this messy kludge: because simply saying "we'll arbitrarily make the program stop running at some point" does not make "smart contracts" written in Ethereum "decidable" - as we've seen, these contracts can still blow up / go wrong in other ways before they run out of gas.
Peter Todd petertodd might also be an example of this confusion (given his history, my hunch is that he probably is - but I haven't had time to do a thorough investigation yet) - with his recent post proposing smart contracts in Bitcoin based on the lambda calculus.
Basically, the only way to avoid falling into the "Turing tar-pit" of confusing and misleading semantics / behavior and undecidability will be to use slightly more restricted languages which are carefully designed / selected to not be Turing-complete.
There are plenty of non-Turing-complete lanaguages available to learn from.
One possibility would be to consider languages which are based on intuitionistic logic / constructivism / Martin-Löf's Type theory / Heyting Logic - which is similar to classical Boolean logic except that Heyting Logic rejects the Law of the Excluded Middle.
What all these "schools of mathematics" have in common is a more restricted and more concrete notion of "proof", supporting a safer mode of computation, where something is considered "proven" or "true" only if you can provide concrete evidence.
By the way, the word "witness" in "Segregated Witness" - meaning a proof that has been constructed, to "witness" the truth of a proposition, or the validity of a block - comes from the realm of constructivism in mathematics.
These languages are somewhat more restricted than Turing-complete languages, but they are still quite expressive and efficient enough to specify nearly any sort of financial rules or "smart contracts" which we might desire.
In fact, the notion "smart contracts" is actually not new at all, and a lot of related work has already been done in this area - and, interestingly, it is based mostly on the kinds of "functional languages" which most of the developers at Core/Blockstream, and at slock.it, are not familiar with (since they are trapped in the imperative paradigm of less-safe procedural languages such as C++ and JavaScript):
Wall Street is already writing DSLs for "smart contracts" - mostly using functional languages
Check out the many, many languages for smart contracts already being used major financial firms, and notice how most of them are functional (based on Ocaml and Haskell), and not procedural (like C++ and JavaScript):
http://dslfin.org/resources.html
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/23448/dsl-in-finance
The lesson to learn here is simple: Just because we are storing our data on a blockchain and running our code on a permissionless distributed network, does not mean that we should ignore the rich, successful history of existing related work on designing financial products and "smart contracts" which has already been happening on Wall Street using functional languages.
In fact, if we want to run "smart contracts" on a permissionless distributed concurrent parallel network (rather than on a centralized system), then it actually becomes even more important to use functional and declarative paradigms and immutable data structures supported by languages like Ocaml and Haskell, and avoid the imperative and procedural paradigms involving mutable data structures, which are almost impossible to get right in a distributed concurrent parallel architecture. (See the video "The Future is Parallel, and the Future of Parallel is Declarative" for an excellent 1-hour explanation of this).
Only non-Turing-complete languages support formal reasoning and verification
Basically, a language which is not Turing complete, but is instead based on the slightly more restricted "Intuitionistic Logic" or "Constructivism", satisfies an important property where it is possible to do "formal reasoning and verification" about any program written in that language.
This is what we need when dealing with financial products and smart contracts: we need to be able to know in advance "what" the program does (ie, before running it) - which can be done using tools such as formal reasoning and verification and "correctness proofs" (which are not applicable to Turing-complete languages).
Turing-complete languages for "smart contracts" are needlessly dangerous because you can't figure out in advance what they do
As the "language design wars" around cryptocurrencies and "smart contracts" begin to heat up, we must always insist on using only non-Turing-complete languages which enable us to use the tools of formal reasoning and verification to mathematically prove in advance that a "smart contract" program actually does "what" it is supposed to do.
Separating specification from implementation is essential for proving correctness
A specification stating "what the smart contract does" should ideally be spelled out separately from the implementation stating "how" it should do it.
In other words, a high-level, more compact & human-readable specification language can be used to mathematically (and in many cases (semi-)automatically) derive (and formally verify - ie, provide a mathematical correctness proof for) the low-level, hard-to-read machine-runnable program in an implementation language, which tell them machine "how the smart contract does what it does".
A simple list of "language design" requirements for smart contracts
The following considerations are important for ensuring safety of smart contracts:
So, the requirements for languages for smart contracts should include:
(1) Our language should be non-Turing complete - ie, it should be based instead on "Intuititionistic Logic" / "Constructivism";
(2) We should favor declarative languages (and also things like immutable data structures) - because these are the easiest to run on parallel architectures.
(3) Our toolbox should support formal reasoning and verification, allowing us to mathematically prove that a low-level machine-runnable implementation satisfies its high-level, human-readable specification before we actually run it
Some YouTube videos for further study
There's a video discussing how declarative languages with immutable data structures (such as Haskell, which is pure functional) are a nice "fit" for parallel programming:
The Future is Parallel, and the Future of Parallel is Declarative
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hlyQjK1qjw8
There's also some videos about how Jane Street Capital has been successfully using the language OCaml (which includes functional, object-oriented, and imperative paradigms) to develop financial products:
Why OCaml
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v1CmGbOGb2I
Caml Trading
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKcOkWzj0_s
Lessons from history
When I see Peter Todd writing a blog post where he embarks on informally specifying a new language for "smart contracts for Bitcoin" based on lambda calculus, it makes me shudder and recollect Greenspun's Tenth Rule, which states:
Any sufficiently complicated C or Fortran program contains an ad hoc, informally-specified, bug-ridden, slow implementation of half of Common Lisp.
Only now, it looks like Peter Todd is going to try to single-handedly re-implement languages like Ocaml and Haskell, and then try to build the same financial DSLs (domain-specific languages) which Wall Street already built on them.
I think a much better approach would be to look show a bit more humility, and a little less of the "NIH" (not invented here) syndrome, and see what we can learn from the vast amount of existing work in this area - specifically, the DSLs (domain-specific languages) which Wall Street is already using with great success for automating financial products and smart contracts:
http://dslfin.org/resources.html
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/23448/dsl-in-finance
And remember, most of that existing work involving DSLs for financial products and smart contracts was done on top of functional languages like Ocaml and Haskell - it was not done on top of imperative languages like C++ and JavaScript (and Solidity, which is "JavaScript-like" in many ways).
There are reasons for this - and any so-called dev who ignores that vast body of existing, related work is simply a victim of too much ego and too little awareness of the fin-tech giants who have gone before him.
I'm sure Peter Todd is having a wonderful time being geek with all this - and the hordes of suck-ups and wanna-be's who slavishly worship the C++ pinheads at Core/Blockstream will be duly impressed by all his pseudo-mathematical mumbo-jumbo - but this is mere mental masturbation, if it ignores the major amount of related work that's already been done in this area.
Smart contracts for cryptocurrencies should use Wall Street's existing DSLs financial contracts written in Ocaml and Haskell as a starting point. Eventually maybe we could also even use a language like Coq for writing specifications, and proving that the implementations satisfy the specifications. Any so-called "dev" who fails to acknowledge this previous work is simply not serious.
Ignorance is bliss, and cock-sure Peter Todd is probably merely embarking on a futile mission of hubris by trying to create all this stuff from scratch based on his limited experience as a hacker gamer coder coming from the procedural / imperative paradigm, apparently unaware of the decades of related work which have shown that doing provably correct parallel programming is a gargantuan arduous challenge which may very well turn out to be insurmountable at this time.**
Lord help us if this immature, ignorant vandal who wants Bitcoin to fail takes the ignorant followers of r\bitcoin and Core down the path of these so-called "smart contracts" - reinventing decades of work already done on Wall Street and academia using Haskell and Ocaml, as they screw around with "easier" languages based on C++ and JavaScript.
Further reading
For more discussion about the emerging "language design wars" around the idea of possibly adding "smart contracts" to cryptocurrencies, here are some recent links from Reddit:
The bug which the "DAO hacker" exploited was not "merely in the DAO itself" (ie, separate from Ethereum). The bug was in Ethereum's language design itself (Solidity / EVM - Ethereum Virtual Machine) - shown by the "recursive call bug discovery" divulged (and dismissed) on slock.it last week.
https://np.reddit.com/btc/comments/4op2es/the_bug_which_the_dao_hacker_exploited_was_not/
https://np.reddit.com/ethereum/comments/4opjov/the_bug_which_the_dao_hacker_exploited_was_not/
Can we please never again put 100m in a contract without formal correctness proofs?
https://np.reddit.com/ethereum/comments/4oimok/can_we_please_never_again_put_100m_in_a_contract/
Would the smart formal methods people here mind chiming in with some calm advice on this thread?
https://np.reddit.com/haskell/comments/4ois15/would_the_smart_formal_methods_people_here_mind/
submitted by ydtm to btc [link] [comments]

I'm appalled by this total lack of taking responsibility.

6 days ago Stephan Tual posted the following article No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract ‘recursive call’ bug discovery. Reason for that was MakerDAO exploit. Weeks before multiple devs, including people from Rootstock, pointed out this fundamental flaw in the DAO contract. No action was taken. Yet now Stephan claims that the unthinkable has happened. Everyone in the dev community was aware of this, we were all just sitting and waiting until the first person exploited it. Now the community just bails them out? It is a bailout, literally. They are bailing out their own investments caused by their own stupidity. I thought the Ethereum community was better and more critical than just accepting what they push down your throats. I'm appalled and disgusted by this behavior. Unforgivable. Forking is the death of Ethereum.
submitted by afilja to ethereum [link] [comments]

The Ethereum Computer - Empowering the individual to control their IoT, identity and decentralize the Ethereum network!

The Ethereum Computer - Empowering the individual to control their IoT, identity and decentralize the Ethereum network! submitted by daydreamtrader to Rad_Decentralization [link] [comments]

4th option to The DAO mess: Would you give 1% to get 99% back without fork?

After watching Gavin Wood presentation https://www.reddit.com/ethereum/comments/4pb75e/this_is_what_good_community_leadership_looks_like/
and reading the latest: "White Hat Siphoning has Occurred. What Now?" https://blog.slock.it/white-hat-siphoning-has-occurred-what-now-f7ba2f8d20ef#.mglcr7m9y
I see that the collective mind got locked on 3 options:
  1. Hard Fork. Liquidate. - ETH returned proportionally to DAO tokens held.
  2. Soft Fork. Freeze. - 14% of ether becomes blocked indefinitely.
  3. NO Fork. Do nothing. - most of 14% will likely go to attacker(s) and then perhaps on the market.
While Gavin in the video does mention some negotiation with the hacker he does not offer it as an option nor proposes anything related to it.
Since the main probable motives of the attacker are: A. Financial. - He is after the money. B. Hostile. - He is after damaging the Ethereum network. C. Other.
It seems feasible to try in parallel to working on the forks to make an offer to the attacker that will be hard for him to refuse in case his motive is A (Financial). If he has other motive this will probably not work.
The idea posted by Adam Byrne on CoinDesk article is below: http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-response-dao-kill/#comment-2742119606 "
Adam Byrne • 2 days ago My solution to #TheDao impasse.
  1. Create a new (and properly vetted, this time) smart contract which will release an agreed and appropriate sum to the hacker.
For the sake of argument, let’s say $1 million, which (it could be argued) is a just reward for his ingenuity and attention to detail.
  1. Create another smart contract (or use the same one?) to release the rest of the funds back to an escrow account (assuming that the total investment was $160 million, then $159 million will be returned).
Therefore less than one percent (0.625 percent) has been ‘lost’ to the hacker.
  1. These losses will be spread on a pro rata basis across all the investors in The Dao.
For example, if you put in $100, you get back $99.375.
  1. Refund the investors through yet another (properly vetted) smart contract and then close down The Dao permanently.
Advantages:
Fund are unfrozen.
The hacker walks away with a reward but relinquishes all claims on the rest of the funds.
Everyone else walks aways with an almost full refund.
MOST IMPORTANTLY:
No roll back (fork) is necessary.
No disastrous precedent is set and the integrity of the Ethereum blockchain is preserved.
The efficacy of properly designed and vetted smart contracts is proved.
We can all move forward and learn from the mistakes that were made.
PS. I do realize that the hacker ‘made it away’ with ‘only’ $50 million of the total $160 million or so invested in The Dao but the precise numbers are not the most important aspect of my proposed solution. Someone else can do the exact calculations. "
If attackers interest is financial it makes a financial sense to get a guaranteed 1% of a big sum then get nothing with the implementation of a fork that will also cause damage to Ethereum.
I ask for a constructive discussion on this thread to try to brainstorm a possible way to offer the attacker(s) a solution to deposit all of the funds into a refund contract with the option to automatically send 1% to the attacker(s) address. This is in order to avoid implementing any kind of fork and avoid damage to ethereum eco system.
This is more elegant and desirable solution if the attacker will be willing to cooperate and does not hold in his intention to hurt the ethereum community.
*Disclaimer: I do not own DAO tokens. But own Ethereum.
submitted by -kvb to ethereum [link] [comments]

The Ethereum Computer by Slock.it - Empowering the individual to control their IoT, identity and make dumb devices smart!

The Ethereum Computer by Slock.it - Empowering the individual to control their IoT, identity and make dumb devices smart! submitted by daydreamtrader to IOT [link] [comments]

Slockit GmbH - YouTube Slock.it - Ethereum Blockchain + IoT - YouTube Slock.it DAO demo at Devcon1: IoT + Blockchain - YouTube Ethereum, A Classic Tale of Two Chains Slock.it MVP Teaser - quick informal update from the Ethereum London Meetup

About Ethereum. Ethereum price today is $359.69 USD with a 24-hour trading volume of $14,306,776,657 USD. Ethereum is up 5.62% in the last 24 hours. The current CoinMarketCap ranking is #2, with a market cap of $40,621,553,162 USD. One of the annoyances of the blockchain as a decentralized platform is the sheer length of delay before a transaction gets finalized. One confirmation in the Bitcoin network takes ten minutes on average, but in reality due to statistical effects when one sends a transaction one can only expect a confirmation within ten minutes 63.2% of the time; 36.8% of the time it will take longer than ten ... The Ethereum PoW chain, therefore, will continue to exist until at least Phase 1 in a form colloquially being referred to as Ethereum 1.x. Developers will still be committed to improving Ethereum 1.x even as the future of Ethereum 2.0 is being built. Conclusion. Ethereum 2.0 has been long-anticipated and much discussed in the blockchain ecosystem. The Ethereum development team, together with a group from the startup Slock.it, developed “The DAO,” a decentralized organization built on the Ethereum blockchain. For the first time in history, an organization whose members could track invested funds in real-time was created. The management process is carried out using automated systems. Slock.it UG est une entreprise allemande qui a l’ambition de fournir au monde entier la future infrastructure d’économie collaborative. Leur produit principal, l’Ordinateur Ethereum, permet à quiconque de louer l’accès à n’importe quel objet intelligent compatible et connecté tout en acceptant des paiements sans intermédiaires par le biais de contrats qui s’exécutent dans la ...

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Slockit GmbH - YouTube

Christoph Jentzsch demonstrates Slock.it's capabilities at the London Ethereum Devcon One conference. Emerging from stealth mode, ambitious German’s startup ... We’re exposing how a hacker exploited a flaw to steal over $60M USD of digital currency called Ethereum. We’ll start with an overview on Ethereum, it’s use of “smart contracts”, and The ... Overall an amazing 3 months, looking forward to seeing the crowdsales of Slock.it and Digix, as well as to try Augur (the decentralized prediction market build atop of Ethereum)! Get the PDF of ... Gavin Wood presentation hack of the DAO smart contract and options Ethereum community #dbc16 - Duration: 18:23. Dutch Blockchain Conference 26,156 views To learn more visit our website: https://slock.it Follow us on twitter @slockitproject --- Slock.it enables anyone to rent, sell or share their property with...

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